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Ecclesia Semper Reformanda Est.
Radical Reformation and the IRS
Mason Powell
"What is a 'church'for purposes of the statute must be interpreted in
the light of the common understanding of the word."
-De La Salle Institute v. United States'
"My good Erasmus, God's church is not so common a
thing as the term 'God's church'. ... "
-Martin Luther, The Bondage of the WilP
INTRODUCTION
H ERE'S the church/here's the steeple/open the doors/and see all the people/here
is the parson going upstairs/and here he is saying his prayers. This simple
children's rhyme has been taught in churches and Sunday schools around
the world for many years to impress upon toddlers a basic understanding of
the church. It comes complete with hand motions that illustrate the verses:
fingers pointed upwards for a steeple, folded hands for prayer, wiggling
fingers that represent "all the people" (everyone's favorite part, of course).
Yet for its simplicity, the toddler's rhyme attempts to address complex
questions that have troubled many grownups for a very long time.4
Here's the church. What makes something a "church"? Perhaps a church is
a steeple and doors-a building. After all, it certainly seems that the droves
of "ordinary" churches and religious groups with which we are familiar
tend to reside within a distinctive physical structure of some sort. When
we see the ornately ornamented buttresses of a cathedral or the towering
minarets of a mosque, we instantly know to identify them as housing a
given religious denomination. But there must be more to a church than
steeples and doors. Surely there must be people, but how many? What type
of people must these people be, and what sort of things must these people
I Mason Powell is a J.D. candidate for May 2013 and Notes Editor for the Kentucky Law
Journal. He holds a B.A. in Theology and Biblical Studies from Boyce College of the Southern
Baptist Theological Seminary.
2 De La Salle Inst. v. United States, 195 E Supp. 891, 903 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
3 MARTIN LUTHER, THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL 122 (J.I. Packer & O.R. Johnston trans.,
Fleming H. Revell rev. ed. 2005).
4 See, e.g., Charles M. Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Prob-
lems, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,887 (1977).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
do? Should they pray and worship, and exactly whose place is it to decide
what passes for prayer and worship anyway?5 What should they believe in,
and just how strongly should they believe in it? Most everyone would claim
to be guided by some sort of moral code or compass, but simply having an
opinion on an abstract ethical matter does not seem to quite fill the frame
of a "religious belief."'6 Thus it seems that differentiating between- a group
of conscientious people and a church might at times be a more difficult task
than one would like to think.
And what about this "parson" fellow in the rhyme? Intuitively it seems
like a church should be led by someone, and that the person should be
responsible in some way for disseminating the tenants of a given religion.
But who must this person be? Should he act on his own accord, or should
he belong to an established order that reports to an ecumenical council
or association of some sort? If a group of people with legitimate religious
convictions chooses not to elect a traditional religious "minister," does this
really mean that they are not qualified to be a church? Deciding whether
a church leader is "qualified" can be a very difficult and sensitive task.
As one court has previously recognized, "one person's prophet is another's
pariah."7
For most people it is not necessary to answer any of the preceding
questions, nor to invent a satisfying algorithm for deciding what a "church"
is, because a church is instinctive; we know one when we see it. If while
driving down the street you see a large stone building with a steeple and
a sign claiming that the building belongs to such-and-such denomination,
you probably have little reason to investigate further. This intuitive
approach was historically favored by courts adjudicating matters that
involved churches.8 Other attempts at defining the church have produced
tautologies rather than guidance. 9 In more recent history, however, unique
factual scenarios have forced courts to revise their standard approach to
adjudicating ecclesiastical groups.t The test endorsed by the IRS is
5 "[W]e must also assiduously avoid expanding our inquiry into the merits of petitioner's
beliefs or risk running afoul of First Amendment religious protections." Found. of Human
Understanding v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1341, 1357 (1987) (citing Parker v. Comm'r, 365 Ezd 792,
795 (8th Cir. 1966)).
6 Machen observes, for example, that the "brotherhood" that unites religious peoples is
distinct from the social doctrine of a "brotherhood of man," despite their occasional ethical
similarities. SeeJ. GRESHAM MACHEN, CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERALISM 157 (Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1923).
7 Found. of Human Understanding, 88 TC. at 1357.
8 See De La Salle Inst. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891, 903 (N.D. Cal. 196i).
9 See, e.g., 1.R.C. § 761 i(h)(i)(A) (2006) (stating that a "church" is an organization claim-
ing to be a church); Treas. Reg. § 1.51 1-2(a)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1979) ("The term church
includes a religious order... engaged in carrying out the functions of a church.").
1o See Found. of Human Understanding, 88 T.C. at 1357-58 (integrating the fourteen-part
IRS test into case law).
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particularly interesting (or, perhaps more accurately, troubling), articulating
a fourteen-part test for establishing a church.11 It is unclear whether each
prong of the test is important but it seems evident that a rigid interpretation
would be so restrictive that only existing traditional church formats could
rightfully be called churches.
While the IRS test seems too restrictive, the "associational test" preferred
by some courts seems so open-ended that almost any group of people with
similar viewpoints could be a deemed a "church.""2 The tests currently
available would therefore seem to range from unwieldy to inadequate.
Moreover, having confusing tests puts existing churches in a precarious
position. If the test applied by courts is burdensome or unpredictable,
then churches may be forced to become increasingly "lawyerly" simply to
pass muster. 3 Given that churches and religious groups enjoy a substantial
degree of deference from the government, it would hardly seem consonant
that the courts should supply them with a burden that forces them to
increase their level of legal sophistication when there are less restrictive
means to accomplish the same end. Can courts apply any of these current
tests to a "church" group that chooses to form as an urban coffee shop14 or
an internet forum 5 and come to a fair and correct conclusion that does not
overly burden churches?
There are in fact many organizations that exist on the line between
"church" and "non-church," but the question of whether any particular
organization should be classified as a church probably does not greatly
disrupt our daily lives. However, from a legal standpoint being able to
accurately identify what is and is not a church can have serious consequences.
After all, churches are extended privileges (and burdens, to a lesser extent)
that are not necessarily extended to other sorts of organizations, such as
an exemption from paying taxes," deductible member donations17 , and
exemption from adherence to many employment statutes, such as the
I I See discussion infra Part lI.B. The elements of the test were not introduced through
any formal legislation, but rather through a speech by IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz in
1978. In the absence of statutory guidance or case law, the fourteen-part test has been given a
sort of "judicial imprimatur." See Found. of Human Understanding, 88 T.C. at 1357-58
12 See Found. of Human Understanding, 88 TC. at 1368-69 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
13 While the government may require fairly advanced legal sophistication from other
businesses, churches are generally insulated from such a burden (and often for good reason).
See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 61o--ii (979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (contemplating
a method of adjudging church disputes that would essentially require churches to become
experts in property and trust law).
14 See, e.g., Synod of the Chesapeake, Inc. v. City of Newark, 254 A.2d 611,612-13 (Del.
Ch. 1969).
15 Matson Coxe, Recent Development, Here Is the Church, Where Is the Steeple: Foundation
of Human Understanding v. United States, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1248 (2o i).
16 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2oo6).
17 See I.R.C. 17o(b)(i)(A)(i) (2oo6).
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Americans with Disabilities Act. 8 For better or worse, churches are simply
treated differently than other types of associations.. On the other hand, if
there is no reason to distinguish a church from any other business entity at
a legal level then there is no reason to grapple with defining it. There are
certainly some who would prefer such an approach generally, but that is
neither the reality of our system nor the focus of this paper. In reality, courts
and administrative agencies must have some reliable method for deciding
what exactly a "church" is.
In short, I intend to propose a new test for deciding whether an
organization is a church. Since there is little beneficial statutory basis
for deciding what a church is, 9 I have decided to propose another path
which courts likely would not be able to consider on their own. Although
courts will always be limited in their ability to investigate theology and
religion, 0 it seems very reasonable that the theological doctrine of the
church established by churches would be a proper sotjrce to consider when
creating a legal definition of church. Thus I will explore an irreducible
ecclesiological minimum and demonstrate how it is possible to synthesize
a new legal formula for churches that can be relied upon by both courts
and religious organizations and be applied to a broad reach of religious
organizations without favoring a given tradition.
The test I propose for defining. "church" consists of four elements:
leadership, common beliefs, spiritual activity, and community. The test in
general should be construed narrowly (if one of the elements is missing,
there is no church), but the elements themselves should be construed fairly
broadly (which will give courts some leeway to examine the unique facts
and circumstances at hand without being rigidly formulaic). I find that the
elements of this test can be administered by the courts without fear of
violating First Amendment jurisprudence while also being accessible to
churches that have no legal sophistication.
Section I discusses the importance of churches and the inherent
semantical difficulties of creating a satisfactory definition to adequately
define "church." Section II will examine the irreducible ecclesiological
minimums utilized by both the government and churches themselves.
Section III will present my own irreducible ecclesiological minimum,
a streamlined version of existing "law"'" that I propose is both legally
and theologically satisfactory. Finally, Section IV of this note provides
conclusory remarks and reiterates the need for, and difficulties inherent in,
creating a legal definition for the church.
18 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC., 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
i9 See Found. of Human Understanding v. Comm'r, 88 TC. 1341, 1356 (1987).
20 See id. at 1357.
21 I find current law defining churches to be quasi-authoritative at best. See discussion
infra Part I.B.
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I. WORDS MADE INCARNATE: THE SEMANTICAL DIFFICULTY
OF DEFINING "CHURCH"
A. Why define "church"?
Churches are important. While it is completely reasonable to question
government tax subsidy of purely religious groups"2 (such questioning
is healthy, as there is little other effective regulation for churches and
religious nonprofits), it is also reasonable to conclude that churches offer
services to the community that relieve a burden from the government and
the taxpayer.2 3 If churches do in fact remove a government burden (even if
only incidentally or unintentionally), then it is sensible to recognize their
contribution, even if we should occasionally wonder at their motives or
practices.
Churches can often penetrate segments of society that other
organizations. (including the government) may not be able to. While
churches may not have the resources to provide comprehensive healthcare
or welfare to a poor community, they may have the ability to provide
important services such as meals, childcare, school supplies, and even
medical and financial aid to communities without a proverbial "act of
Congress."24 And since churches are not constrained by financial motives
and duties to stockholders (theoretically, anyways), they may target their
efforts at poorer social strata without much pressure to do otherwise.
Churches play an important role in society, even from a purely humanistic
perspective, and it is not unreasonable to hope that the government would
have a set of rules that distinguish and define churches.
However, it is one thing for theologians and scholars to define "church"
and another indeed for the government to define it. Theologians may
define or redefine "church" with an eye towards reformation or codification
of beliefs.2 5 Theological reform, however, probably is not the goal of courts
22 The government granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily entangles the two.
See Walz v. Tax Comm'nl 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
23 First, [religious] organizations [like churches] are exempted because they,
among a range of other private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-
being of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens
that would otherwise either have to be met by general taxation, or be left undone,
to the detriment of the community Waz, 397 U.S. at 687.
24 Southern Baptist Disaster Relief workers, for example, were already manning twenty
Hurricane Katrina relief posts in the Gulf region by August 31, 2005-the day before FEMA de-
livered supplies to survivors in the Superdome (who had been without food or water for days).
Tim Yarbrough, Response to Katrina Largest Ever for Southern Baptists, BAPTIST PRESS (Aug. 31,
2005), http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=2 1495.
25 The mantra that "heresy precedes orthodoxy" suggests that orthodoxy (a definition of
"proper" church practice) comes only after improper church practice has been observed. The
2012-20131
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and legislatures when defining "church." Just as "religion" may connote a
variety of meanings according to various legal purposes, 6 the contextual
approaches to defining "church" would seem to be various and sundry.
There seem to be two primary theatres of the law that command most of
the caseload on this topic, with several secondary and tertiary legal spheres
orbiting not too far away.27 The primary litigation forms that -demand
a workable definition of the church are tax and zoning, which of course
will often overlap. As far as zoning is concerned, it is fairly common for
religious groups to begin meeting in a member's home in violation of local
ordinances." In a recent highly publicized case, for example, the courts
rejected a Phoenix man's claim that the local government was'using fire
codes and zoning ordinances to discriminate against his small "friends and
family" home bible study.2 9
While some may find it especially taboo to restrict acts of worship in a
person's home, it also seems unreasonable to subject a suburban subdivision
to loud music, an influx of traffic, or a public bathhouse.3" Zoning laws
affect churches in ways that are decidedly local and context-sensitive and
are often greatly affected by local values, policy, and even bias.3
The tax consequences.of being a church are more obvious and are of
more national concern. There are tens of thousands of churches in the
most pressing theological concern when stating what church is is often the perceived threat
of what church is not.
26 See, e.g., James M. Donovan, God Is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of
"Religion," 6 SETON HALL Co0sT. L.J. 23,30 (1995).
27 For example, the legal definition of church (including the fourteen IRS factors con-
sidered at length in this article) has been debated in the context of ERISA. See Goetz v. Greater
Ga. Life Ins. Co., 554 F Supp. 2d 831, 836 (E.D. Tenn. 2008).
28 See Portage Twp. v. Full Salvation Union, 29 N.W.zd 297, 299 (Mich. 1947).
29 See Salman v. City of Phoenix,,Nol CV i I-o646-PHX-FjM, 2011 WL 3439o8o, at* 1
(D. Ariz. Aug. 5, 2011 ). In Salman, a man requested a building permit for a structure on his
lawn. When the zoning committee asked if he was building a church, Salman insisted that he
was not. Based on his representations he received a permit and completed the structure. He
promptly installed a pulpit, seating, and erected a sign outside that said "Christian Worship,.
Sunday io:oo AM, Wednesday 7:00 PM." Each service at the "non-church" was attended by
46-50 people. When neighbors complained, Salman was charged with 67 building and zoning
code violations. He argued that this was only a small "family and friends" home bible study,
not a church, and thus the government had no right to intervene. The court disagreed and
found that Salman had in fact built a church that was subject to zoning laws.
30 See Sexton v. Bates, 85 A.2d 833,836 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1951). In Sexton, a bath-
house for ritual cleansing for Jewish females was determined not to be a church despite the
fact that the ritual was necessary under church tradition. The petitioners were not aided by
the fact that the bathhouse, rather than containing the simple cleansing vessels mandated by
tradition, contained beveled mirrors, colored tiles, and "modern beauty parlors" and charged
a nominal fee for entrance.
31 See Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 Fd 293, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that denying a zoning variance to an Islamic center violated the Constitution when
every permit that had been requested by Christian churches had been granted).
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United States that claim exemption from federal income tax as nonprofit
organizations.3" Thus there would seem to be, at least from the viewpoint
of the IRS, a very present need to define precisely what a church is.
However, as will be discussed in this paper, no definition exists in the tax
code.3 3 Instead, the IRS uncharacteristically allows churches to claim tax
exemptions via,a process that is most succinctly described as an "honor
system.'
A formulation of "church" may appear (at least tangentially) in other
legal contexts as well. It seems intuitive that such a primal expression of
religion as the church would command a great deal of First Amendment
litigation, but in practice First Amendment law focuses more on the struggle
to aptly define "religion," not "church. ' 3 The distinction is subtle (though
important and demonstrable) and in any case is largely outside the ambit
of this paper. The issue of defining the church is also approached obliquely
on the rare occasion when a court must settle an internal church dispute.
36
Although this is not strictly a paper about tax exemptions for nonprofit
entities, the uncertain (or rather absent) definition of "church" in the tax
scheme is the major backdrop of my discussion below. Having a workable
definition of "church" will provide religious groups with a degree of
confidence to their own tax liability and will allow courts and the IRS to
apply a uniform standard to any church or "almost-church" over which
they preside.
B. Semantics: Churches, Religions, and Houses of Worship
For many, mere recitation of the word "church" in a legal context
instantly offends political correctness. Certainly to strict adherents of
the various faiths it would be inappropriate to label a temple, mosque, or
synagogue as a "church." There are a few other terms used to describe the
32 Churches, of course, claim their tax exemptions as 501(c)(3). organizations. See I.R.C.
§ 501 (c)(3) (zoo6).
33 The absence of a definition for a concept of such significance as "church" from the 29
bound volumes of 26 U.S.C. (which does take the time to define "Machineguns" and "Indoor
Tanning Services") is fairly conspicuous. See I.R.C. § 5oooB(b)(i) (2oo6); 26 I.R.C. § 5845(b)
(2oo6).
34 The IRS does not require registration of a church for tax-exempt purposes for fear of
violating first amendment jurisprudence. See I.R.C. § 5o8(a) (zoo6). Howeyer, churches that
wish for the contributions of their donors to be exempt generally must file.
35 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965) (holding, in a seminal case
on the constitutional definition of religion, that even an unclear and non-systematic belief in
a deity may qualify as a religion).
36 See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 8o U.S. ( 3 Wall,) 679, 68 1 (1871) (holding that courts should
defer in religious matters to the ruling of the highest ecclesiastical body of a church in the
case of internal strife).
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same concept that err on the side of political correctness, such as "house of
worship," 37 "religious organization,' 38 or simply "religion," though it could
be rightly argued that none of these are completely adequate to grasp what
we are talking about. There is certainly some interchangeability between
the terms "church," "religion," and "house of worship," but on a diagnostic
level there are significant differences between the three.
"Religion" and "religious organization" would seem to be the most
open-ended of the group. Historically the definition of "religion" in the
courts required relating to and obeying a Creator,3 9 or "belief in a relation to
God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."40
Today, however, it seems that to be regarded as religious one only needs
to have convictions on a matter that affects "ultimate questions concerning
the human condition,' 4' provided that the belief be comprehensive rather
than a singular teaching and have some sort of external manifestation.
4
1
Defining religion is something of a nebulous abstract, whereas defining
what constitutes a "church" has serious pragmatic consequences-while
a disagreement about the definition of relIigion may stir debate between
competing theories of the First Amendment, a disagreement about the
definition of the church may impact noise pollution in your neighborhood.
4
As the standard for being "religious" is permissive, abstract, and generally
only used in conjunction with an individual, it is not a sufficient term to
describe the church.
It can be difficult at times to distinguish churches from religious
organizations but there is some guidance as to the difference: "It is generally
accepted that Congress intended a more restricted definition for a 'church'
than for a 'religious organization,' but probably because of first amendment
considerations it has provided virtually no guidance on this distinction."
' 44
Churches would seem to basically be a subset of religious organizations.
Thus the "square and rectangle" distinction exists; a church is a type of
religious organization but a religious organization is not necessarily a type
of church.
37 See Capital City Rescue Mission v. City of Albany Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 652 N.Y.S.zd
388 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (discussing the requirements under a local statute of a "house of
worship").
38 For tax purposes at least, churches are considered a subset of religious organizations.
That is to say, a church is a religious organization but not all religious organizations are church-
es.
39 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,342 (I89o).
40 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605,633-34 (1931).
41 Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981).
42 Id.
43 See Portage Twp. v. Full Salvation Union, 29 N.W.2d 297, 299-30o (Mich. 1947).
44 Spiritual Outreach Soc'y v. Comm'r, 927 F.2d 335,338 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Church
of the Visible Intelligence That Governs the Universe v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 55 (1983)).
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A "house of worship" is likely the most comparable analogue to the
general understanding of a "church" and does away with the obviously
Christian overtones of the woid "church." Still, implicit in its name is that
there must be present a "house" and "worship." This implication may or
may not be correct for certain legal scenarios, 4 but it would likely be less
than palatable to religious leaders that insist that a building is not required
for church.
Because of the heavy influence on our own political system by the
early American and European churches, the modern concept of "church" is
bound up in a context that is perhaps not entirely fitting. I do freely admit,
however, that it is not always appropriate to force the square peg of "church"
into the round hole of American religion. While acknowledging the religious
(specifically Christian) undertones that the word implies, I still choose to
generally frame this article in terms of the "church" rather than "religious
organization" or "house of worship." For one thing, "church" is the word
used most predominately in court cases and statutes, and it is also the
language used in the relevant IRS authority. That being said, I occasionally
will interchange the other terms for the sake of avoiding repetition. In the
event that I do so, I mean to use the words as lowest common denominator
synonyms, although as I stated above I believe that the words do have their
own discrete meanings, nuances, and implications. While i find it illogical
to attempt to mute a concept as markedly theological as the church with
theologically neutral terminology, I do acknowledge the "fine print" that
is attached to the word "church," and thus I proceed with an element of
caution as I attempt to explicate a uniform vision of "church."
II. AN IRIiEDUCIBLE ECCLESIOLOGICAL MINIMUM
A. A Theological Irreducible Ecclesiological Minimum
When asked to define "church," most people begin with the concept of a
building where people meet to perform some religious activity.' Generally
speaking, "church" is understood to be a place. This is not necessarily
incorrect for legal purposes but yet it must be more. How much more is, of
course, the real question.
For a long time the general jurisprudence regarding the composition of
a "church" was simply this: a church is what we commonly understand it
to be.47 This definition is inadequate and has given rise to more complex
tests for establishing a church." For those who have not spent much time
45 In the case of a zoning matter, for example, it would seem especially appropriate that
there be some sort of structure subject to the zoning.
46 SeeJ.D. PAYNE, DISCOVERING CHURCH PLANTING 40 (2009).
47 See De La Salle Inst. v. United States, I95 F. Supp. 891, 903 (N.D. Cal, I96i).
48 See Found. of Human Understanding v. United States, 88 Fed. C1. 203, 218 (2009),
2012-2013]
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attempting to synthesize a definition of the American church, however, it
is important to begin by explaining why simplistic judicial appraisals of the
church are ineffective. Consider the following:
[I]magine two artists given the assignment to paint a picture of
a building. After several hours of painting, the artists complete
their tasks and reveal to us their masterpieces. Artist A painted a
building in the form of a skyscraper. Artist B also completed the
task accurately, but he painted a building in the form of a school.
... Their mental images of a building greatly influenced their
final works of art.
49
A "common understanding" approach to defining a church is flawed from
both a legal and theological viewpoint because even reasonable and like-
minded people may have very different understandings of what makes up
a "church." The problem is even more apparent when weighed against the
vast amount ofunique religions in the United States.50 Courts today realize
this but have been given little legislative instruction in the matter and thus
struggle with choosing a consistent standard that adequately encompasses
the concept of "church.""1 For this reason, I believe it is necessary to
introduce the irreducible ecclesiological minimum, a tool which will aid us
in locating the factors necessary for a church to exist.
An irreducible minimum is a logical and mathematical tool often utilized
by courts and lawyers in many contexts, 52 whether they consciously call it by
that name or not. An irreducible minimum, logically enough, contemplates
the event horizon at which a concept cannot be further divided without
sacrificing its essence. Taking away from the irreducible minimum causes
a concept to degrade either into nothingness or into its constituent parts.5 3
Ecclesia (LOKKXi aia in Greek) is a word that may have a broad range of
theological meanings (from a simple assembly to a more complex universal
church) 4 but at its essence simply means "church."55 Thus it should be
evident that the goal of identifying an irreducible ecclesiological minimum
aff'd, 614 F3d 1383 (Fed. Cir, 20io).
49 PAYNE, supra note 46, at 35.
50 See Self-Described Religious Identification Adult Population: 199o, 200!, 2oo8, U.S. CEN-
SUS BUREAU,. http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2o12/tables/I2soo75.pdf (last visited
March 26, 2012).
51 See Spiritual Outreach Soc'y v. Comm'r, 927 F2d 335, 338 (8th Cir. 1991).
52 Irreducible minimums are contemplated in several legal spheres. See, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56o (1992) (discussing an irreducible constitutional mini-
mum necessary to establish standing); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 555
(1989) (contemplating the irreducible minimum of the holding in Roe v. Wade).
53 If standing, for example, is reduced beyond its irreducible minimum it is no longer
standing, though it may still be cognizable as the three separate elements of injury-in-fact,
causality, and likely redressability. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 56o-6i.
54 See PAYNE, supra note 46, at 41.
55 See id.
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is to decide, at minimum, what elements must be present for a church to
exist. If these elements are absent, there is no church.
The actual nomenclature of the Irreducible Ecclesiological Minimum
comes from the writings of Dr. J.D. Payne of The Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary. For Payne, finding the irreducible ecclesiological
minimum is finding the "basic essence" of what makes a church. s6 The
concept is most often used by ministers to determine the most fitting way
to plant a new church so that it is culturally appropriate.-7 Put another way,
religious organizations identify an irreducible ecclesiological minimum
in order to mold churches to be sensitive to the respective community
without sacrificing any of what it takes to be a "church." The "trappings"
of a traditional protestant church might not be appropriate in the context of
an ethnic refugee neighborhood, for example."'
The task of determining what constitutes a church from a legal and
religious standpoint is clouded by the understanding that we are not
necessarily talking about the same thing.
In this definition we do not say that the visible church is the
church as any person in the world (such as an unbeliever or
someone who held heretical teachings) might see it, but we
mean to speak of the church as it is perceived by those who are
genuine believers and have an understanding of the difference
between believers and unbelievers. 59
A "believer" of a given religion may find the discussion of a legal
definition of church to have no impact on their ecclesiology, or perhaps
"miss the mark" entirely. I intend some biblical wordplay here; "miss
the mark," originally an archery term, is the definition of the Greek
word Llictp1TfvWIv, or E1pcpoot , which in Septuagint scripture is translated
as "sin."' It is possible that a believer of a particular religion would find
a legal definition of "church" to be closer to heretical than probative.6'
The definition of "church" certainly can change depending on yout
viewpoint; from a religious standpoint, for example, the church can have
a broader meaning, encompassing both the local church and the universal
body of believers, or the "catholic" church (note the small "c"). 6 As our
court system likely is not terribly interested by the abstract concept of a
56 Id. at 32.
57 See ED STETZER, PLANTING MISSIONAL CHURCHES 31 (2006).
58 Id. at 122.
59 WAYNE GRUDEM, SYSTEMATIC T"-JEOLOGY 856 (1994).
60 Many theologians also claim that the Hebrew word nux has the same connotation,
although this is debated linguistically. See I DAVID DAUBE, THE DEED AND THE DOER IN THE
BIBLE: DAVID DAUBE'S GIFFORD LECTURES 42-44 (Calum Carmichael ed., 2oo8).
6i Id.
62 PAYNE, supra note 46, at 41-42.
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universal brotherhood of adherents of any faith, I am restricting my focus
to the actual auspices of the local church.
Before investigating much religious authority on the elements of
the church, it is probably important to point out views that are not very
useful for our purposes. One protestant church model, for example,
explains that individual churches must be "self-governing"63 and "self-
supporting," 64 which would seem to be more of a reaction against episcopal
church models that have top-heavy leadership formats. Under this view,
established churches such as the Roman Catholic Church would likely
not be considered a church, nor would any others that employ non-local
leadership. Distinguishing between established religious sects is not the
domain of this article, so those sorts of church models will be ignored for
our purposes.
Many religious works on the constitution of the church also seem not
to distinguish greatly between the elements necessary to be a religious
adherent in the church and the elements necessary for the existence of the
church itself.65 This observation will be valuable to us when we consider
later in this article the ultimate conclusion that a community of adherents
is the most basic unit of the church.66 Even though much of the information
gleaned from explicitly religious sources on the constitution of the church
may be outside the bounds of this article, there is still some value that can
be distilled from them for the purpose of establishing a legal church, and
we should not allow knee-jerk reactions about the separation of church
and state to deprive us of resources to deal with an explicitly religious legal
issue.
While reasonable minds may differ over what constitutes a church, I
believe that my proposed irreducible minimum addresses the shortfalls of
current law while satisfying the theological concerns of the religious groups
most likely to interact with this body of law. I propose that churches are,
at their essence, composed of four common criteria: leadership, common
beliefs, spiritual activities, and community. I will give greater attention to
this proposal below, but suffice it to say that I believe these four elements
are common to all churches, satisfy existing law, and adequately distinguish
between a church and other types of religious organizations.
As discussed above, the IRS has a considerable stake in the definition
of a church since there are a great number of churches who avoid paying
income tax. While the IRS does not have an explicitly codified standard for
defining "church," courts have interpreted other materials as a constructive
irreducible minimum and attributed it to the IRS. We will begin by
examining this manifestation of the irreducible ecclesiological minimum.
63 See id. at 2 .
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., GRUDEM, supra note 59, at 853.
66 See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
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B. The Irreducible Ecclesiological Minimum of the IRS
It should be noted again at the outset that these criteria are not a
section of the Internal Revenue Code, nor did they originally appear in a
published court opinion. Rather, these criteria were presented in a speech
by former IRS commissioner Jerome Kurtz, although several courts have
given these rules a sort of "judicial imprimatur.' '67 Despite the fact that
comments made in a speech seem like a poor source for creating law, at
least one court has gone so far as to consider the fourteen criteria as more
authoritative than actual treasury regulations when considering a church
for a tax exemption.6 It is fascinating (and probably disconcerting) that
comments made at a conference can carry the weight of law when they
have not been created by any legislative body, agency, or court; this reality
further underscores the present and actual need to create a uniform
irreducible ecclesiological minimum. According to Mr. Kurtz's speech, a
church must satisfy the following criteria to be eligible for tax exemption:
1) a distinct legal existence;
2) a recognized creed and form of worship;
3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government;
4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline;
5) a distinct religious history;
6) a membership not associated with any other church or
denomination;
7) an organization of ordained ministers;
8) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies;
9) a literature of its own;
10) established places of worship;
It) regular congregations;
12) regular religious services;
13) Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young; and
14) schools for the preparation of its ministers. 69
C. Shortcomings of the Fourteen-Part Test
67 Found. of Human Understanding v. Comm'r, 88 TC. 1341, 1358 (1987).
68 See Spiritual Outreach Sot'Y v. Comm'[, 927 F.zd 335, 338 (9th Cif. 1991); Luthetan
Social Serv. of Minn. v. United States, 758 F2d 1283, 1286-87 (8th Cir. 1985).
69 See Spiritual Outreach Soc'y, 927 F2d at 338 (citing Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r, IRS, Ad-
dress at the PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax Planning (Jan. 9, 1978), in FED. TAXES
(P-H), 1978, at 9 54,820).
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The real danger of this test is not that it will be taken literally but
that courts will acknowledge that they cannot constitutionally require
each element and thus fashion strange, arbitrary mutations of the test,
as discussed in this section. Some of the elements of the IRS test, for
example, seem. on their face to preclude the recognition of new church
forms. A distinct history, for example, may be hard to establish for almost
any religious group, as most churches come into being by splintering away
from another tradition or sect.70 And if a church is truly new and unique
without any history based in a different denomination or faith, then it would
seem to be unable to exist as a church under this rule until it had already
existed for whatever time period equates with "history." This would seem
to be either logically impossible (that is, there can be no church history
if an organization is not a church) or some sort of arbitrary.and undefined
probationary period that would require a religious group to exist for some
amount of time before it can be considered a church.
Conceivable arguments can be made against almost all of the fourteen
factors. Primitive Baptists do not recognize "schools for the preparation
of its ministers" and thus do not have ministers that are "selected after
completing prescribed studies.""1 Should they therefore not be affoided a
tax exemption since they fail two factors of this "test"? The list of religious
groups that do not observe "Sunday school" would be so extensive as not
to be practical to reproduce here. The bias implied by a "Sunday school"
requirement is manifest; Jews, Muslims, Seventh Day Adventists, and so on,
would all lose tax exempt status if this requirement were strictly enforced.
If the requirement is distilled to simply mean "a method for educating
children in the faith," then it is conceivable that it would preclude a
hypothetical religious group that believes that the religious education
of children is strictly the providence of the family unit, or at least does
not provide for organized education in the church.7" The requirement of
systematically educating children in the tenants of a faith would also seem
to fail to distinguish a church from a religious school, which is arguably one
of the purposes of defining "church" in the first place.
7 3
70 All of the diaspora of Baptist denominations in America, for example, are all splin-
ter groups from a common origin. See American Baptists, A Brief History, AMERICAN BA TIST
CHURCHES USA, http://www.abc-usa.orglLinkClick.aspx?fileticket=cgvZuPqWxVU%3D&ta
bid=8o (last visited March z6, 2012).
71 JOHN. G. CROWLEY, PRIMITIVE BAPTISTS OF THE WIREGRASS SOUTH 6o (1998).
72 Such varied groups as the Amish, Hindus, and various protestant groups all place a
strong impetus on training children in the faith at home, although not necessarily to the exclu-
sion of the church.
73 See Heard v. City of Dall., 456 S.W.zd 44o, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). In Heard, an insti-
tution was held not to be a church even though it was led by the vicar of the affiliated church
and primarily taught religious instruction.
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It seems especially troublesome that one of the factors of "central
importance"7 4 is "regular religious services.""5 The regularity of church
services can be ascertained by both the frequency of gatherings and by
the observance of traditional days of worship.76 In Foundation for Human
Understanding, the religious group did not meet the threshold for regular
religious services because their meetings were too infrequent and
sporadic.77 Similarly, the court in Spiritual Outreach held that bi-monthly
meetings (held on Saturdays to avoid conflict with their members' other
church responsibilities on Sundays) and times of prayers, meditation, gospel
music, and spiritual study were not "regular" within the meaning of the
IRS test.7" If there is no evidence of fraud or deception against the IRS, it
is difficult to see what possible legal theory mandates frequent and regular
meetings of churches. The Foundation court speculated that churches
that do not meet regularly are not fulfilling an associational or communal
requirement. 9 Even if some sort of communal activity is a requisite of a
church (I contend later that it is),8" it is difficult to see how the communal
"quality" of the meetings influences whether the services were sufficiently
frequent and regular.8'
While most traditional religions do have a designated day of the
week to meet, surely there cannot be any demonstrable reason for why a
church's meeting date is'important to the IRS and thus the court system.
The implicit lesson of Sherbert v. Verner would seem to be that the courts
will recognize a church regardless of its preferred date of worship. If the
true meaning of this requirement is that the members of a church must
in fact meet in the most general sense of the word, it seems like it is only
a duplicative provision to ensure that there has been no sham tax filing
by a single person. The requirement does not address whether internet or
74 Spiritual Outreach Soc'y v. Comm'r, 927 F.2d 335, 339 (8th Cir. I99) (citations omit-
ted).
75 Id. at 338.
76 See Found. of Human Understanding v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 203, 231 (2009),
aff'd, 614 E3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
77 Id. (holding that the unpredictable nature of the weddings, seminars, and meetings
conducted by the Foundation were not sufficient to constitute a "regular" church service).
78 Spiritual Outreach Soc'y, 927 E2d at 337. It was perhaps significant that the Spiritual
Outreach Society met primarily in an outdoor amphitheater, and thus did not frequently con-
vene in winter months.
79 See Found. of Human Understanding, 88 Fed. Cl. at 231-32.
8o See infra Part III.D.
81 The court in Foundation held that any seminars, radio broadcasts, or meetings were
not regular (that is, frequent and planned) because they were not communal. See Found of Hu-
man Understanding, 88 Fed.Cl at 231-33.
82 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963). In this case, the Court extended
benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who had been fired from her job for refusing to work on
Saturdays.
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radio communication or other "unorthodox" interaction is sufficient as a
regular service. In any event, it is difficult to draw a direct nexus from tax
exemption to regular meeting times.
Since reading the fourteen criteria strictly or literally would disqualify
many established religious groups from being considered tax-exempt
"churches" (and for that matter would seem to impose unconstitutional
burdens on religious groups to operate in a certain way - such as meet
on a Sunday or establish a seminary - with no countervailing government
interest at stake), it is reasonable to assume that at least some of the criteria
must be taken figuratively if they are to be taken at all.' It is unclear,
however, how to distribute the authoritative weight of the criteria. Courts
have considered this dilemma as well and, rather than rejecting the entire
premise and finding a firmer foundation on which to build the definition of
"church," have found cause to give preeminence to several of the elements
at (apparent) expense to the others:
While some of these are relatively minor, others, e. g. [sic] the
existence of an established congregation served by an organized
ministry, the provision of regular religious services and religious
educationfor theyoung, and the dissemination of a doctrinal code, are
of central importance. The means by which an avowedly religious
purpose is accomplished separates a "church" from other forms
of religious enterprise. At a minimum, a church includes a body
of believers or communicants that assembles regularly in order
to worship. Unless the organization is reasonably available to the
public in its conduct of worship, its educational instruction, and
its promulgation of doctrine, it cannot fulfill this associational
role.84
Although the court made the effort to attempt to distinguish which of
the fourteen elements were most important, there does not seem to be
any clear reason why they place emphasis on the elements they chose. It
may well be that "established congregation" is vital to the existence of
the church but it is difficult to see from a hermeneutical standpoint why
this is more essential to a church than the "recognized creed" or "ordained
ministers" requirements. Kurtz's criteria do not seem to be arranged in
any particular hierarchical order, and there does not appear to be any other
evidence suggesting why one criterion is more important than another.
Assigning more intrinsic merit to a given factor (and then using this factor
as controlling common law) seems particularly arbitrary where the body of
factors itself may be construed as arbitrary.
83 It is unclear exactly how to apply conventions of statutory interpretation to subject
matter that is certainly not a statute. It is to assume, for example, that a statutory requirement
for seminary training would probably not survive a constitutional test. Many of the prongs
would be hard pressed to pass constitutional muster.
84 Am. Guidance Found., Inc. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 304,306 (D.D.C. 198o) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted).
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The arbitrariness of the factors becomes even more confused when
the role of administrative deference is considered. In Spiritual Outreach
the Eighth Circuit minimized the IRS test as nothing more than a guide,
while simultaneously stating that they were required to give considerable
deference to the factors since they are agency interpretations. 5 The court
proceeded to stress the handful of factors it "deemed to be of central
importance" while dismissing the rest.8 6 Creating a golem out of the spare
parts of the IRS test hardly seems like a sound way to create good law; it
certainly does not sound like deference to an agency. In short, it would be
more logically satisfying for courts to adopt all fourteen parts of the test as
stated (which I believe would likely be unconstitutional) or to completely
reject them; a middle ground is troublesome.
To their credit, the IRS seems to stipulate that their test probably
should not be taken as gospel.87 The IRS goes so far as claiming that, rather
than creating a new standard, they were simply providing a guide for the
"common understanding" standard of De La Salle."' This claim seems
especially dubious given that courts uniformly reject (or, more accurately,
"decline[] to adopt") DeLa Salle in favor of the IRS test.89 Given that courts
have found the constitutionality of De La Salle "is not without doubt"'
and have not made similar claims about the fourteen-part test, the IRS
test seems rather to be its own beast, irrespective of the intention of the
Service.
If the purpose of the cited language from American Guidance Foundation
was to differentiate between churches and other religious entities (such
as religious schools, for example), then it is also difficult to see how the
"important" church factors do in fact differentiate a church from a church
school.91 Does requiring a church to ensure the "dissemination of a
doctrinal code" and "religious education for the young" actually help to
differentiate a church from a religious school?9" Are these not the prime
directives of most religious schools anyway? Is it also not true that most
religious schools have some form of regular religious service? In short, I
propose that the factors courts have highlighted as distinguishing a church
from other religious institutions are perhaps often among those that least
distinguish them.
85 Spiritual Outreach Soc'y v. Comm'r, 927 F2d 335, 339 n.4 (8th Cir. 1991).
86 Id. at 339.
87 Robert Louthian & Thomas Miller, Defining "Church" - The Concept of a Congregation,
IRs.Gov 2-3 (1994), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopica94.pdf.
88 Id. at 2.
89 See Found. of Human Understanding v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 203, 218 (2009),
aff'd, 614 E3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
90 See Spiritual Outreach Soc'y, 927 F2d at 339.




III. A NEW IRREDUCIBLE ECCLESIOLOGICAL MINIMUM
If the fourteen factors endorsed by the IRS and adopted by the courts are
an inaccurate method to identify and define churches, then what standard
should be applied? I suggest that a much shorter test can be developed to
identify] churches that will not overtlj restrict the development of churches
and will not require churches to decipher a scattershot fourteen part test to
determine their exemption eligibility. The test I propose has four criteria
that I believe adequately encompass the essence of "church." I pose my
four criteria within the matrix of an irreducible ecclesiological minimum,
which is to say that if any of the four are not met then I would not consider
a "church" to exist. 3
I frame my arguments in a theological context (I cannot find an
intellectually satisfactory method of defining "church" otherwise), with
complete acceptance of the fact that much of the theology would not be
accessible to the courts. To wit, I attempt to synchronize any theological
references with the existing fourteen IRS criteria in order to demonstrate
that my proposed "church" test is not only theologically satisfying but also
is a valid interpretation of existing law under the IRS standard.
As mentioned above, I propose that the four criteria that must be
present for the valid existence of a church are leadership, common beliefs,
spiritual activity, and community. 4
A. Leadership
Most religious groups, be they "major" or "minor" in population,
acknowledge some form of' hierarchical leadership. Some of these
leadership structures are infamously complicated.95 While certain religious
groups have their churches organized regionally into- wards or synods
(Presbyterians and Lutherans, respectively), other groups emphasize the
independence of local churches (Southern Baptists, for example). Even
churches with decentralized leadership structures have some form of
leadership, even if that leadership is manifested in the form of a spiritual
person in charge of disseminating the teachings of the faith.'
93 While failing a prong of my test may prohibit an organization from being a church, it
does not necessarily follow that it will be prohibited it from being a tax-exempt entity. This
realization does not nullify the purpose of the test; the distinction between the exemption of
charitable donations (rather than just income tax exemption) often makes status as a church
preferable to status as another non-profit organization.
94 See discussion supra in INTRODUCTION.
95 See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Comm'r, 63 TC.M. (CCH) 2422 (1992).
96 See infra footnotes 97-98.
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A Rabbi usually leads a Modern Jewish church. The Rabbi developed
from the ancient Hebrew Levitical Priesthood.97 In the Jewish tradition the
Rabbi is held to be a deeply spiritual man98 as well as a teacher.' Muslim
Imams are also considered to be profoundly spiritual teachers of Islamic
faith.1 0 Even eastern religions, which are arguably more decentralized than
monotheistic religions, recognize Brahmin and Sadhu that serve as teachers
and monks in religious culture.
Although we have discussed the decidedly Christian roots of the word
"church," it may be surprising to know that Jesus actually makes very
few direct references to the concept. In fact, he uses the word 0KXhioa
in only two passages of the Greek New Testament. In the first instance,
Jesus addresses his disciple Peter: "I also say to you that you are Peter,
and upon this rock I will build My church; and the gates of Hades will not
overpower it."' 01 Despite the sparse treatment he gives to the church, the
passages do give insight into what Jesus may have considered important
elements of the church. This passage is of course the source of much
debate. Roman Catholics use the verse as authority to establish the papacy
through Peter,0 ' while Protestants often interpret the pAssage to mean that
the church will be built upon the confession 10 3 that Peter had made." 4 Both
views are historically valid and relevant for this discussion. Regardless of
whether the verse authorizes the line of papal succession, Peter became
a key leader of the early church, 05 and the confession of faith made by
believers remains a defining characteristic of the church. 1°6
Suffice it to say, it is difficult to imagine a religious group (and thus a
"church") that has no form of leadership (even if the leadership is minimal,
ineffective, corrupt, or otherwise "non- traditional"). Even a church that
vests its power in the members of the congregation must make decisions
(although from personal experience, often inefficiently), lest they never
accomplish anything. This requirement would serve to minimize very
loose federations of religious people or perhaps various "cultish" anarcho-
97 Ancient Hebrew Priests were generally required to be from the tribe of Levi. Aaron,
for example, was a Levite.-
98 See KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF GOD 72-73 (1993).
99 Armstrong notes that the synagogue tradition was greatly influenced by an influx
of Greek culture. Rather than simply a place for worship, the synagogue became a forum
for sharing ideas. Crowds would come from miles around to hear notable speakers. See ARM-
STRONG, supra note 98, at 66.
I oo See ARMSTRONG, supra note 98, at 162.
IoI Matthew t6:18 (New American Study Bible) (emphasis added).
io2 Id.
103 Id.
104 "You are the Christ, the Son of the Living God." Matthew 16:16 (New American
Study Bible).




communes from claiming benefits as a church. The leadership does not
necessarily need to employ a certain pretense or title, but someone in a
church must make decisions on how to proceed. The current IRS definition
of church leadership is inadequate because it goes beyond a requirement of
religious leadership and emphasizes a formal course of education.07 How
could the IRS require a seminary education of a Hindu who believes that
his status as a religious leader is the product of centuries of reincarnation?
B. Common Beliefs
It. would be too vague to simply say that a church requires "beliefs"
without giving some content to what those beliefs may be. Must the beliefs
be systematic, addressing spiritual matters of prime importance as well as
those that are relatively minor? Must the beliefs come from somewhere
in particular, such as a holy book or a prophet? The current state of the
law requires that a legitimate religious belief answer "ultimate questions
having to do with deep and imponderable matters."t18 The belief also needs
to be comprehensive and not limited to a belief about a single topic. 09
The nature of these beliefs should be given a great degree of deference,
as courts should generally avoid deep investigation into the merits of a
particular religious belief."' The need for agreement on comprehensive
beliefs should not be read so broadly as to preclude "non-denominational"
churches. If a group of believers from various denominational backgrounds
share enough important beliefs, they should not be precluded from
establishing a church because of tangential or tertiary matters.
A common belief would seem to imply that at least some fundamental
truth is acknowledged by all of the adherents of a given faith. "Common
beliefs" would seem to subsume the IRS requirements for a recognized
creed and a formal code of discipline without the baggage that might be
associated with either of those terms." An associational test, though perhaps
not specifically listed among the IRS criteria, can perhaps be constructively
assumed from the requirement for a code of discipline."' Although this
element does not seem so vital in the IRS construction, could it really be
a vital belief of a church? Association seemed to be at play for the court in
American Guidance when deciphering the fourteen IRS criteria."' Churches
need to have a mechanism to dissociate themselves with people that do
107 See discussion supra Part lI.B.
io8 Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 98i).
i9 See id.
11 See 3ones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 595-"96 (1979).The statements of religious ecclesiasti-
cal bodies are generally deferred to.
i i i See discussion supra Part II.B.
112 See discussion supra Part I.B.
113 SeeAm. Guidance Found. v. United States, 49o FSupp. 304,306 098o).
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not share their beliefs, or elsethey are perhaps not a legally functioning
"church" under the First Amendment: 114 This associational requirement
has some theological background as well. "If he refuses to listen to them,
tell it to-the church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be
to you as a Gentile and a tax collector.""'l This legal freedom of association
is also expressed as an entry filter; a church must be allowed to decide
who it admits. This element of ecclesiastical association seems to have
been upheld recently by the Supreme Court."6 While discipline has not
been widely contested in the IRS context, it nonetheless seems to be
an important common belief of the church that a court is competent to
understand.
C. Spiritual Activities
For Martin Luther, the marks of the church were twofold: teaching
the gospel, and administering the sacraments."' Calvin similarly defined
the church as preaching the word of God and administering sacraments."
8
Teaching the gospel would seem to fall within our current framework that
a church must espouse a certain creed, but administering a sacrament
is distinct from a simple teaching of the church. In the simplest terms
possible, sacraments are physical practices of the church that yield a
spiritual benefit."9 Especially in the ancient and medieval churches, these
sacraments took on an almost mystical or magical importance.' The actual
language of "sacrament" is probably not palatable for usage in the courts,
but it should be appropriate to distill the concept down to its basic tenant:
a physical action with a spiritual significance. While all churches may
argue about the types, significance, and hierarchy of sacraments, it would
114 See Brief for International Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 247o840.
115 Matthew 18:17 (New American Standard Bible) (emphasis added).
116 See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 698 (holding that the ministerial exception bars
an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister challenging the church's
decision to fire her).
I 17 3 PHILIP SCHAFF,'IYHE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 11-12 (1877).
118 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 4.1.9, 1023 (Henry Beveridge,
trans., 1536).
119 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2012), available at http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/sacrament (defining sacrament as "a Christian rite (as baptism or the Eucha-
rist) that is believed to have been ordained by Christ and that is held to be a means of divine
grace or to be a sign or symbol of a spiritual reality).
120 1 JUSTO GONZALEZ, 'TIE STORY OF CHRISTIANITY 153-54 (1984) (discussing the theol-
ogy of the Donatists. The Donatists maintained that any salvific significance of a sacrament
was based on the worthiness of the priest, rather than the believer. Therefore, it was not un-
common for unsuspecting parishioners to find that their salvation had been revoked because
their priest was found guilty of some ecclesiastical offense).
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appear that all churches have in common some form of spiritual activities.
Since spiritual activity would seem to be common (primary, even) to our
conception of church, it is appropriate to include spiritual activity-as an
irreducible element of the church.
This spiritual activity test could be satisfied by such outward
manifestations of faith as prayer, worship, proselytizing, or some other
related activity. In theory, these outward manifestations of faith are
the reason that churches have tax exemptions in the first place."' The
overarching reasoning behind subsidizing churches, as already mentioned,
assumes that the government is relieved of some burden by the existence
of churches.' Whether the government receives a benefit in a given case
by the specific spiritual practice of a church is, however, not determinative
of whether a church exists."2 3 Churches are not required to prove that each
of their actions benefits the government; churches do not have to "sing for
their supper."
1 2 4
It is true that none of the activities I have listed as spiritual activities
can be divorced from the creedal element I have already suggested. This
would perhaps suggest that the natural limitation of spiritual activity is that
the activity must stem from the religious beliefs of the church. The Eighth
Circuit has recognized this same limitation.under the current IRS Test,
although I find their reasoning to be somewhat circular:
When we view the activities of [the group LLS] in light of
the regulation and criteria set forth above, we believe that the
district court was correct in concluding LSS is not a church.
LSS's primary activities consist of providing social services to
the public at large irrespective of their religious beliefs. Not only
are the services available to persons of any religious belief, but
LSS's counselors are not required to counsel with any particular
religious orientation. Such services are secular in nature when
performed by secular organizations, and cannot be transformed
into "ministrations of sacerdotal functions" merely because
they are performed by a religiously affiliated social service
organization like LSS.25
121 SeeWalz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,676 (1970) (noting that "few concepts are more
deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life ... than for the government to exercise at
the very least this kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious exercise gener-
ally so long as none was favored over others and none suffered interference").
122 See id.
123 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986). In order to qualify for tax-exempt status, the religious
organization's activities must not result in profits that inure to the benefit of the individual or
substantially intervene in political affairs.
124 See Branch Ministries v. Rosotti, 40 ESupp.2d 15, 19 (1999) (noting that churches
may but do not have to file for § 5o1(c)(3) status in order to be recognized as a tax exempt
entity).
125 Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Minn. v. United States, 758 E2d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. li~
RADICAL REFORMATION AND THE IRS
I believe the Eight Circuit's rationale is that, the performance of a
"secular" activity is not enough in the absence of other factors to push
a "religious organization" across the threshold to become a "church," but
the conclusion borders on tautology-because LSS was.not a church, they
were not able to perform the "sacerdotal functions" that would enable
them to be a church. This also raises some suspicion about other iterations
of the elements of a "church" that seem to imply that the default rule
is that an organization is a "church" until it is proved not to be."2 6 This
logic suggests that organizations default to "religious organizations" and
must prove that they are churches. Assuming the logical coherence of the
reasoning, it would still seem that the court is ill--equipped to investigate
whether an activity is secular or "sacerdotal." In any event, great deference
should be given to a religious organization or church in the execution of
spiritual activities under the existing IRS test. I believe that the spiritual
activity prong would be easier to satisfy under my test-if there is a rational
relationship between a stated rel igious belief of the church and the alleged
religious activity, then the activity should probably pass the "spiritual
activity" test unless there are other serious factors present (such as fraud
or deceit) that would lead a court to doubt the validity orsincerity of the
activities themselves.
C. Community
The final element of my irreducible ecclesiological minimum is
reflected in the writing of many modern theologians. A church must, of
course, be populated by people. Grudem writes that community of God's
people at any level-local, regional, universal-may rightly be called a
church." 7 Payne builds on this concept, providing that the community of
believers in a church should have some bond of commitment to each other
and exist as a local "expression" of the church at large.t, This community
should aim to be helpful to all people, but especially the other members
of the community.2 9 Many religious groups instinctively acknowledge the
community implied by "church."'
30
The element of "community" reinforces the intuitive IRS requirement
that a church have a congregation,'3 ' while admittedly doing away with the
126 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 761 i(h)(i)(a) (2oo6) (stating essentially that a church is an organiza-
tion claiming to be a church).
127 See GRUDEM, supra note 59, at 853.
t 8 See PANNE, supra note 46, at 46.
129 Id.
130 Mosques, for example, often function as community centers in many nations around
the world.
131 See discussion supra Part II.B
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requirement that the congregation be "regular." 13 The IRS implies that.
this may even be the most important of all the "prongs" of their test.33
Even if there were some definition of "regular" congregation versus an
"irregular" congregation, it is still unclear what ill the requirement of a
"regular" congregation is intended to cure. Can a church truly not exist
if a different group of people show up next week than showed up this
week? Could a church near an army base lose its tax exemption because
the soldiers and families that normally attend get deployed to another
base while a different unit takes their place? It is difficult to see that any
threat exists in having different congregants from week to week. Perhaps
the requirement of a "regular congregation" is merely observational; most
established churches do indeed have a "usual crowd."
Using "community" as an irreducible minimum of the church- also
mitigates some of the assumptions that a church is merely a building, as
opposed to a group of believers. It is not uncommon for church communities
to meet variously in homes, school, public parks, and so on; especially given
the often insurmountable economic barriers to owning a traditional "house
of worship." Should a church lose its tax exemption because it chooses
to meet in a school gymnasium? Such a measure would seem to punish a
religious nonprofit organization for making a business decision not to invest
in property, a business decision which is in no way an attempt to contravene
tax law or abuse public policy.
While I realize that I have not given much weight to any of the fourteen
IRS criteria, I do accept the stipulation of "a membership not associated
with any other church or denomination" as being a valid subset of the
community requirement because it successfully closes off several loopholes
that may otherwise exist. This stipulation would prevent religious nonprofit
groups such as travelling evangelistic "crusades" or summer camps from
being considered a church. However, "forbidding" a person with sincere
religious beliefs from holding multiple church memberships could be an
unconstitutional restraint on the exercise of religion.
Although I do not find that the actual four walls of a building should be
a determinative factor in finding a church, I do acknowledge that for many
religious groups a building can have great (even transcendent) importance,
such as Solomon's Temple. 134 Islam also gives special importance to
132 See discussion supra Part II.B.
133 Robert Louthian & Thomas Miller, supra note 87.
134 The historical development of the temple in Jerusalem, for example, is voluminous
and fascinating. After the Exodus from Egypt, Moses and Aaron stored the Ark of the Cov-
enant in the Tabernacle, an elaborate tent that the Hebrews took with them as they sojourned
through the wilderness. The Tabernacle, rather than being a place of assembly as we might
think of "church" today, was a temporary "home" for the divine presence of God. The He-
brew name for the Tabernacle nvo1) mischkan), roughly translated to "dwelling place" of the
presence of God. Some worship functions were conducted at the Tabernacle, such as priestly
sacrifices for the sins of the Hebrew nation. The next "phase" in the development of the
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physical structures, yet acknowledges that there is an ultimate disconnect
between their faith and the building in which they practice it.3 ' It is also
fairly obvious that my minimum for defining "church" will necessarily
involve a dispute over a physical property if it is applied to zoning cases.
136
Nevertheless, it is theologically demonstrable, and legally relevant, that a
church can exist without owning a traditional church building if there is a
community of believers that fulfill the other requisites of being a church.
CONCLUSION
While the current body of law regarding the constitution of the church
is incomplete, it also manages to be too formalistic and complex. Court
decisions have inexplicably elevated the fourteen-part IRS test to the
level of the law, despite the criticism the test has received. This awkward
test, which was likely never meant to be law at all, leaves both courts and
churches uncertain of what the law is. Courts are forced to make decisions
about theological issues that they are not equipped to deal with, and
churches are forced to make sophisticated legal distinctions that they are not
well equipped to make. The four-part test that I have suggested combines
the workable parts of the IRS test with the standards already understood
by the religious community to represent the foundational elements of any
"church." My irreducible ecclesiological minimum captures the essence of
the church without the unpredictability of the IRS test.
In addition to being unpredictable and difficult to apply, the current
tests for defining a church stymie the propagation of churches. If new and
creative types of churches are not allowed to come into existence, then
the public and government will both lose a valuable public service that
Congress has already seen fit to subsidize with tax exemptions. While it
is possible that new church forms may occasionally be abused to create
tax shelters and alter egos, this can occur with any business format. The
purpose of this article is not to suggest that there should be less regulation
Jewish church was the temple. Built by Solomon, the temple was and still is the epicenter of
global intrigue and the source of great tension in the Levant. The Temple (and the Taber-
nacle before it) was seen as housing the literal presence of God. While viewing your church
building as the dwelling place of a deity would seem to raise the importance of the physical
structure, it does not necessarily follow that the body of believers is less important (that is to
say, a physical church building and a congregation of believers do not necessarily oppose one
another on a continuum).
135 "The earth has been made for me (and for my followers) a place for praying ...
therefore anyone of my followers can pray wherever the time of a prayer is due." SAHIH AL-
BUK~t~tt, Vol. 1, Book 7, No. 33 t .The modern concept of a mosque descends from masjid, or a
place of prayer. While the mosque is the preferred place to pray, Muslims are not bound by
the walls and minarets of the facility.
136 See Sexton v. Bates, 85 A.2d 833, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 195 i), Clearly if there
is no ritual-spa claiming to be a church, then there is nothing to litigate.
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over such an occurrence, and indeed the courts should always have the
capacity to decide when an organization exists for fraudulent purposes.
The standards I suggest merely present a simple and flexible way to codify
the definition of "church" so that both courts and religious organizations
will be able to effectively interface with churches without the burden of
deciphering perplexing law.
